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Essays
Enforcement in Domestic Violence Cases
Hon. Hollis L. Webster*

I. INTRODUCTION

Across this country, victims' of family violence have not received
appropriate protection and assistance, while their abusers have been
able to escape prosecution and financial liability. 2 Responding to this
problem, the State of Illinois (the "State") has made significant progress in recognizing domestic violence as a pressing social and legal
concern by enacting the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986' (the
"Domestic Violence Act" or the "Act"). Intending to recognize domestic violence as a serious crime, and acknowledging that the legal
system has ineffectively dealt with the issue,4 the Act provides a
statutory framework for courts to issue protective orders and to impose
criminal penalties for violations of these orders.'
* Associate Judge, Eighteenth Judicial Circuit Court of DuPage County, Illinois;
B.S., University of Illinois, 1977; J.D., Loyola University Chicago, 1982. Law Clerk
to the Honorable John A. Nordberg, U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, 1982-83; Hinshaw & Culbertson, 1983-91; Editor DuPage County Bar
Association Journal, 1991-93. The author is currently assigned to hear domestic
violence criminal cases and has been appointed by the Illinois Supreme Court to serve as
a faculty member for judicial training in the areas of Domestic Violence, D.U.I., and
Ethics. This Essay is based on a seminar from the 1994-95 regional meeting of the
Illinois Judicial Conference on Domestic Violence.
1. Though technically incorrect, for the purpose of this Essay the term "victims" will
refer mainly to battered wives and their children. The author acknowledges the existence
of battered husbands in this country, noting nevertheless that they are substantially
smaller in number than their female counterparts.
2. See Naomi R. Cahn & Lisa G. Lerman, Prosecuting Woman Abuse, in WOMAN
BATTERING: POLICY RESPONSES 95, 101 (Michael Steinman ed., 1991); Raymond I.
Parnas, Judicial Response to Intra-Family Violence, 54 MINN. L. REV. 585, 598-99
(1970); Ellen Pence, The Duluth Domestic Abuse Intervention Project,6 HAMLINE L.
REV. 247, 247-49 (1983); Matthew Litsky, Note, Explaining the Legal System's
Inadequate Response to the Abuse of Women: A Lack of Coordination, 8 N.Y.L. SCH. J.
HUM. RTS. 149, 162 (1990).
3. Pub. Act No. 84-1305, 1986 Ill. Laws 1602 (codified as amended at ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. ch. 750, §§ 60/101 to 60/401 (West 1993 & Supp. 1995)).
4. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 750, § 60/102 (West Supp. 1995).
5. See, e.g., id. § 60/214 (describing the issuance of orders as well as available
remedies). In August 1993, the State General Assembly further addressed the problem of
family violence by making court supervision unavailable to those found guilty of
domestic battery. Id. ch. 730, § 5/5-6-1(c).
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This Essay addresses the various tools Illinois courts may use to
enforce protective orders and criminal judgments effectively. First,
this Essay reviews the remedies available to a petitioner obtaining a
protective order. 6 Next, it examines the vital role "victim court advocates" 7 play in assisting victims.8 This Essay then discusses various
means available to enforce protective orders, 9 and some common
administrative problems in the entry of such orders.' ° It next examines
the process of enforcing criminal charges, from arresting batterers
through imposing court-mandated treatment programs." Finally, this
Essay concludes that, as the public becomes better-educated about
domestic violence, the criminal justice system will respond more
effectively. 12

II.

ORDERS OF PROTECTION-AVAILABLE REMEDIES

Civil orders of protection, designed to separate the parties and
prevent unlawful conduct, offer a wide range of remedies. Accordingly, the primary purpose of such orders is not to punish past
conduct, but to prevent future harm. The Domestic Violence Act sets
forth seventeen remedies available to petitioners, some of which a.
court may not grant at the exparte stage.' 3 If a court finds past abuse
and likely future irreparable injury, it may issue an order of protection
and grant the following remedies to petitioners:
Illinois has not been alone in addressing this problem. Various other jurisdictions
have developed domestic violence protocols which coordinate efforts to charge,
prosecute, and sentence batterers. These protocols include mandatory arrest policies,
vigorous prosecutions, support services for victims, and court-mandated treatment
programs for defendants. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-38b (West Supp.
1994); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1031 (Supp. 1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.30(9)(b) (West
Supp. 1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2307 (Supp. 1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 629.72(1)
(West Supp. 1995). See also Developments in the Law: Legal Responses to Domestic
Violence, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1498, 1506-20 (1993) [hereinafter Legal Responses to
Domestic Violence] (discussing tools utilized by various jurisdictions to combat
domestic violence); Diane F. Medley, Comment, Separating the Victim from the Abuser:
Chapter 94-135 and the Florida Legislature's Most Recent Attempts to Control
Domestic Violence, 7 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 169 (1994) (discussing Florida's response to
domestic violence). See also infra notes 75-76 and accompanying text for a description
of the protocol in DuPage County, Illinois.
6. See infra part II.
7. See infra part III.
8. See infra part III.
9. See infra part IV.
10. See infra part V.
11. See infra parts VI-X.
12. See infra part XI.
13. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 750, § 60/214 (West Supp. 1995).
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1. A court may prohibit abuse, neglect, or exploitation by the respondent.' 4 This remedy includes a prohibition of "harassment,
interference with personal liberty, intimidation of a dependent, physical abuse, willful deprivation, neglect, exploitation, . . . or
stalking."' 5 Courts
universally grant this remedy upon issuing a pro16
tective order.
2. A court may grant exclusive possession of the petitioner's
residence, without affecting title to 8the property. 7 Courts may grant
this remedy on an emergency basis.
3. A court may issue a "stay away" order against the respondent,
including orders to stay away from the petitioner's school, work, or
other specified places at times when the petitioner is present.' 9
4. A court may order counseling for the respondent, including
psychological, psychiatric, or alcohol and substance abuse counseling. 20 This remedy is available only if the respondent has been
personally served, has answered, or has made a general appearance.2 '
5. A court may award physical care and possession of a minor
child to the petitioner.22 This remedy is available on an emergency
basis.23
6. A court may award temporary legal custody of a minor child to
the petitioner. 24
7. A court may determine the respondent's visitation rights.25
The order must specify dates and times of visitation, and any other
specific conditions, such as supervised visitation.26
8. A court may prohibit the respondent from removing a minor
from the state or concealing a minor child within the state.
14. Id. § 60/214(b)(1).
15. Id.
16. Courts grant this remedy because it essentially prohibits the respondent from
criminal conduct or the type of abuse that supported the entry of the order.
17. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 750, § 60/214(b)(2).
18. Id. The statute does not specifically prohibit courts from granting this remedy on
an emergency basis.
19. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 750, § 60/214(b)(3).
20. Id. § 60/214(b)(4).
21. Id. § 60/210(d).
22. Id. § 60/214(b)(5).
23. Id. The statute does not specifically prohibit courts from granting this remedy on
an emergency basis.
24. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 750, § 60/214(b)(6).
25. Id. § 60/214(b)(7).
26. Id.
27. Id. § 60/214(b)(8).
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9. A court may order the respondent to appear in court, with or
without any minor children.28
10. A court may grant possession, though not title, of personal
property to the petitioner, provided the order specifically identifies
such property.29
11. A court may
order the protection of certain items of specified
30
personal property.
12. A court may award temporary support of the petitioner or any
minor children. 3' This remedy is available only if the respondent has
been personally served, has answered, or has made a general appearance.32
13. A court may order the payment of any losses suffered by the
petitioner.33 This remedy is available only if the respondent has been
personally served, has answered, or has made a general appearance.34
14. A court may prohibit entry to the petitioner's residence while
the respondent is under the influence of alcohol or drugs and
constitutes a threat to the safety of the petitioner or minor children.35
15. A court may prohibit the respondent's access to records,
including school or other records of a minor child in the care of the
petitioner.36 This remedy is available only when a court has prohibited
the respondent from having contact with the minor child,37 if the
petitioner's address is omitted from records filed with the court,38 or if
necessary to prevent the abuse, concealment, or removal of a minor
child.39
16. A court may order the payment of shelter services by the
respondent.4 This remedy is available only if the respondent has been
personally served, has answered, or has made a general appearance.4 '
28. Id. § 60/214(b)(9).
29. Id. § 60/214(b)(10). If the order does not specifically identify the property,
courts may not enforce the remedy.
30. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 750, § 60/214(b)( 11).
31. Id.§ 60/214(b)(12).
32. Id. § 60/210(d).
33. Id. § 60/214(b)(13).
34. Id. § 60/210(d).
35. Id. § 60/214(b)(14).
36. Id. § 60/214(b)(15).
37. Id.
38. Id. For further explanation of removing the petitioner's address, see id.
§ 60/203(b).
39. Id. § 60/214(b)(15).
40. Id.§ 60/214(b)(16).
41. Id. § 60/210(d).
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17. A court may order injunctive relief. 42 Courts often use this
remedy as a "no contact" order or to limit contact for a specified purpose, such as supervised visitation.43
I.

VICTIM COURT ADVOCATES

Battered women's shelters and other social agencies may offer
victims of domestic violence a variety of support services, including
providing victim court advocates to assist in court proceedings. The
contribution of these advocates in achieving the stated goals of the
Domestic Violence Act is invaluable."4 These advocates are often the
victim's first source of information about obtaining protective orders.
Moreover, these advocates provide vital guidance in shepherding the
pro se victim through the legal process. Oftentimes, the victim suffers
from emotional and physical trauma and is ill-equipped to complete the
process without an advocate's support. Advocates also assist in the
enforcement process by encouraging victims to testify, as well as by
providing support throughout the trial and sentencing hearings. Although prosecutors are charged with the duty of preparing and trying
the criminal charges, victim advocates can give witnesses the emotional support necessary to follow through and cooperate with the
prosecutors' efforts.
While the judge's role is to be an impartial arbiter of the facts and
the law, the court must also understand the dynamics of domestic
violence. The reluctance of victims to testify, coupled with the potential for further and increased violence, justifies the court's marshaling
of all available resources to administer justice effectively. Since victim
advocates are often more successful than prosecutors in encouraging
victims to follow through on criminal charges, courts may refer pro se
litigants to local victim advocacy agencies. For example, when issuing
emergency protective orders or when dismissing criminal charges
because victims recant, judges may not only refer victims to local
domestic violence shelters, 45 but also under appropriate circumstances
refer victims directly to advocates in the courtroom.4
42. Id. § 60/214(b)(17).
43. See id. Such an order is injunctive relief pursuant to statute. Courts enter it to
prevent further abuse, neglect, or exploitation, or to effectuate one of the other
remedies. Id.
44. For a description of these goals, see id. § 60/102.
45. Under such circumstances, the author will often distribute shelter service cards to
the victims from the bench.
46. In this situation, the author has physically directed victims to advocates present
in her courtroom.
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Victim advocates play a vital role in helping the legal system protect
victims of domestic violence. The earlier a victim reaches an advocate,
the more beneficial the advocate's involvement can be. Victim advocates, who are often located at shelters, police stations, and in
courtrooms, assist domestic abuse victims in obtaining safe shelter, in
receiving orders of protection, and in referring the victims to agencies
for legal, medical, psychological, or economic assistance. Some domestic violence protocols require arresting officers to advise the shelter
shortly after every domestic battery arrest. 47 Because Illinois law
provides that defendants out on bail must avoid contact with victim
family members for seventy-two hours,48 if arresting officers advise
shelters of the arrest during this time period, victims can receive help
in obtaining a protective order before the time period expires. This
enables victims to remain in their homes under the shield of an emergency protective order. 49
IV. ENFORCING PROTECTIVE ORDERS
Without a viable means of enforcement, a protective order provides
no more protection than the thin sheet of paper on which it is written.
In fact, without viable enforcement, such an order may increase a
victim's danger by creating a false sense of security. Courts may
enforce a protective order only if the respondent intentionally violates
the order after knowing of its contents.5° Nevertheless, even if offen47. See supra note 5. The DuPage County, Illinois, Domestic Violence Protocol
requires an arresting officer to contact the shelter in the county where the arrest occurred
as soon as possible. If necessary, the arresting officer may then assist the victim to the
shelter. DUPAGE COUNTY STATE'S ATTORNEY TASK FORCE ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, THE
DUPAGE COUNTY DOMESTIC VIOLENCE MANUAL 1-6 (rev. 1993) [hereinafter DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE MANUAL].

Specifically § 8 of this manual provides that an arresting officer

should "[i]mmediately contact[] the victim advocacy service (Family Shelter) for victim
assistance following a domestic violence related incident if the victim advocacy services
are needed on site. Otherwise, the victim advocacy service should be called within the
officer's tour of duty." Id.
48. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 725, § 5/110-10(d)(1). For further discussion of this
provision, see infra part VII.
49. By forcing the alleged abuser to leave the residence, if he lives there, or to stay
away from the victim's residence, if he does not live there, the victim can feel secure in
her own home and need not immediately go to the local shelter.
50. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 750, § 60/223(d). The Act continues:
[T]he respondent has actual knowledge of [the] contents [of an order of
protection if] as shown through one of the following means:
(1) By service, delivery, or notice under [ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 750,
§ 60/210 (describing service of orders of protection)].
(2) By notice under [ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 750, § 60/210.1 or 211
(describing service in conjunction with a pending civil case or hearings)].
(3) By service of an order of protection under, [ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch.
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ders know of these orders and their contents, if they do not perceive
any meaningful risk of being arrested, they may violate orders
routinely. For such an order to have any "teeth," the court system
must monitor compliance and victims must report violations. Most
importantly, police, prosecutors, and judges must respond sternly to
reported violations.
Courts may enforce violations through either civil or criminal
contempt proceedings. 5' Civil contempt proceedings may be appropriate to achieve compliance with certain remedies, such as the
payment of support, losses, or shelter services, but such proceedings
are generally discouraged for violations alleging further abuse or
harassment.52 A finding of civil contempt is not intended to punish,
but rather to secure compliance with the court's directive.53 In fact,
law enforcement officers have no immediate powers to arrest for civil
defendant must be given an opportunity to
contempt because the
"undo" his behavior. 54 Therefore, in cases where a violation does not
otherwise qualify as an arrestable offense, civil contempt proceedings
provide ineffective immediate protection to a victim.55

750, § 60/222 (describing service by the sheriff)].
(4) By other means demonstrating actual knowledge of the contents of the
order.
Id.
5 1. See id. § 60/223(b).
52. See generally PETER

FINN & SARAH COLSON, CIVIL PROTECTION
LEGISLATION, CURRENT COURT PRACTICE, AND ENFORCEMENT 49-63 (National

ORDERS:

Institute of
Justice Issues and Practices, 1990) (discussing enforcement of civil protection orders);
Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, supra note 5 (discussing effective remedies to
combat domestic violence).
53. See In re Marriage of Logston, 469 N.E.2d 167, 177 (Ill. 1984); People ex rel.
Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Barasch, 173 N.E.2d 417, 418 (II1. 1961); In re Marriage of Betts,
558 N.E.2d 404, 415-16 (I11. App. 4th Dist. 1990), appeal denied, 567 N.E.2d 328 (111.
1991).
54. See Logston, 469 N.E.2d at 177 (stating that a civil contemnor must have an
opportunity to purge himself of the contempt finding by complying with the pertinent
court order).
55. Most civil contempt orders do not provide for immediate incarceration, but rather
delay incarceration so as to afford contemnors the opportunity to comply with the court
order. For example, in Logston, a civil contempt order sentenced Eugene Logston to not
more than six months in jail. Id. The order allowed him to purge himself of contempt
and avoid serving any of the sentence, however, by complying with the court's order
within 30 days. Id.
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Indirect criminal contempt" may also be a ground to enforce protective orders,57 though it may also prove to be ineffective in situations
where the victim needs immediate action. A finding of indirect
criminal contempt generally must conform to the same constitutionally
mandated due process requirements that are available to all criminal
defendants." Thus, because a court cannot summarily find and
punish an individual through an indirect finding of criminal contempt,
such a finding fails to provide an effective, immediate scheme of enforcement.
Nevertheless, Illinois has adopted the preferred scheme of enforcement-criminal prosecution-and has authorized police officers to
make warrantless arrests of those violating protective orders. 9 This
scheme grants police officers clear authority to detain not only those
whom they witness violating an order, but also those whom they have
probable cause to believe committed a violation, even if not in the
presence of the officers. 60 Furthermore, Illinois prescribes that those
who knowingly violate "restraining" orders of protection 6' are guilty
of Class A misdemeanors, 62 and those intentionally abducting chil56. Illinois law divides contempt into direct and indirect contempt. People v.
Jashunsky, 282 N.E.2d 1, 3 (I11.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 989 (1972). Direct criminal
contempt is contemptuous conduct occurring within the presence of the judge so that all
elements of the offense are within the judge's personal knowledge. People v., L.A.S.,
490 N.E.2d 1271, 1273 (I11. 1986). In contrast, indirect contempt is contemptuous
conduct occurring outside of the presence of the court so that the court must depend upon
evidence of which the judge has no judicial notice. Id.; People v. Harrison, 86 N.E.2d
208, 210 (Ill. 1949); see also James A. Francque, Note, People v. Simac: How Much is
too Much Advocacy?, 26 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 793, 795-800 (1995) (discussing the
differences between direct and indirect contempt).
57. See ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 750, § 60/223(b).
58. In re Betts, 558 N.E.2d at 425. In Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968), the
United States Supreme Court stated that a defendant is entitled to a jury trial under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments when the punishment for contempt indicates that it is
a serious offense. Id. at 198. Moreover, the Court specifically stated that this is a right
that does not apply to petty offenses. Id. at 209; cf. People v. Carter, 267 N.E.2d 362,
364 (Il1. App. 2d Dist. 1971) (holding that a contemnor sentenced to six months for
indirect criminal contempt was not deprived of the constitutional right to a trial by
jury).
59. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 750, § 60/301(a).
60. Id.
61. For the purpose of this Essay, "restraining" orders of protection are those which
prohibit abuse, neglect, or exploitation; grant exclusive possession of the petitioner's
residence; order the respondent to stay away; or prohibit the respondent from entering
the residence while under the influence of alcohol or drugs. For a description of these
remedies, see id. § 60/214(b)(1), (2), (3), (14); supra notes 14, 17, 19, 35, and
accompanying text.
62. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 720, § 5/12-30(d). While the first violation of an
order of protection is generally a Class A misdemeanor, a second or subsequent violation
is a Class 4 felony. Id.
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dren63 are guilty of a Class 4 felony. 64
The Domestic Violence Act "encourages" a judge to impose a minimum of twenty-four hours imprisonment for respondent's first
misdemeanor violation and a minimum of forty-eight hours imprisonment for a second or subsequent violation.65 Although sentence length
is at the discretion of the sentencing court, the statute suggests that
these minimums be imposed "unless the court explicitly finds that an
increased penalty or that period of imprisonment would be manifestly
unjust., 66 This language seems to require that the court state on the
record at the sentencing hearing why imprisonment was not imposed.
Additionally, a sentencing court may consider evidence of any
violations of a protective order to increase, modify, or revoke bail on
an underlying criminal charge, or to modify the order itself.67 Certainly, a court may also revoke or modify any prior court supervision
or conditional discharge on this basis.
V. ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES

Any court having jurisdiction can enter orders of protection.68
Nevertheless, judges usually enter these orders in a domestic relations
court, criminal court, after-hours court, or bond court duty judge
setting. The Domestic Violence Act is clearly intended to make the
court system "user friendly" to victims of abuse, encouraging the entry
of protective orders to avoid future harm. 69
Unfortunately, in practice, obtaining a protective order often becomes a race to the courthouse between the parties involved in a
domestic dispute. Moreover, litigants may misuse the process as a
sword in a hotly contested divorce proceeding, rather than as a shield.
As a result, different courts may issue conflicting orders, leaving the
police to decide which orders to enforce and how to deal with any
63. Child abductors may also violate orders of protection which govern the physical
care and possession of the child, grant temporary legal custody of the child, or
prohibiting the removal or concealment of the child. See id. ch. 750, § 60/214(b)(5),
(6), (8); supra notes 22, 24, 27, and accompanying text.
64. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 720, § 5/10-5(d) (West 1993). Violations of custody
or support orders may also be enforced under the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of
Marriage Act. See id. ch. 750, § 5/611.
65. Id. § 60/223(g)(3) (West Supp. 1995); cf.id. ch. 720, § 5/12-30(d) (imposing 24
hours of imprisonment for a second offense under the criminal code).
66. Id. ch. 750, § 60/223(g)(3)(iii); cf. id. ch. 720, § 5/12-30(d) (containing similar
language).
67. Id. ch. 750, § 60/223(g)(4).
68. Id. ch. 720, § 5/12-30(b); id. ch. 725, § 5/112A-9 (West 1993); id. ch. 750,
§ 60/223(b) (West Supp. 1995).
69. See id. ch. 750, § 60/102 (West Supp. 1995) (describing the purposes of the Act).
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mutually exclusive remedies, such as exclusive possession of a residence granted to both parties.
The Act attempts to deal with this problem by prohibiting "mutual"
orders of protection and discouraging "correlative separate" orders.7°
In light of the potential for entering a conflicting order, a judge considering a petition for an order of protection should always determine
if there is any other action pending between the parties. If so, the
judge presiding over that action should hear the petition. For example,
if a criminal charge of domestic battery is pending and either the victim
or the defendant wishes to obtain a protective order, both parties
should present their petitions to the judge hearing the criminal case, so
that there is less likelihood of different judges entering conflicting
orders.
Nevertheless, consolidating petitions into pending divorce or criminal files will not always alleviate the potential for conflict. In some
cases, a court will issue an emergency order of protection before any
criminal charges are filed, resulting in two separate case files. For
example, if a defendant obtains an order and later faces criminal
charges, the victim may then seek an emergency order during the
seventy-two hour bond "stay away" restriction. 7' This creates a
potential for further conflict and violence if both parties attempt to
enforce their own orders, particularly if the orders grant such remedies
as exclusive possession or physical care of a minor child, or possession of certain personal property.
Understanding this administrative nightmare, however, does
nothing more than provide a wake-up call to judges responsible for
hearing these petitions. Conventional wisdom suggests that if petitioners provide credible bases for courts to grant protection, judges
should enter orders liberally in order to protect potential victims.
Illinois safeguards a respondent's due process rights by making a
hearing available within two days of the entry of an emergency
order.7 The only true resolution of these conflicts, however, is to rely
upon the judge's determination of whether abuse truly occurred in the
past and the likelihood of irreparable injury if the respondent was
given prior notice of the petition.73

70. Id. § 60/215.
71. For a description of this provision, see id. ch. 725, § 5/110-10(d); text
accompanying supra note 48; infra part VII.
72. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 750, § 60/224(d).
73. Due to the ex parte nature of an emergency hearing for an order of protection,
many petitioners believe that prior notice to a respondent will trigger further abuse.
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VI. CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT

The Domestic Violence Act mandates that all law enforcement
agencies develop and implement written policies concerning arrest procedures for domestic violence incidents.74 In response, several
counties have developed domestic violence protocols to comply with
the Act and further its purpose in recognizing domestic violence as a
serious crime. For example, the DuPage County Domestic Violence
Protocol (the "DuPage County Protocol") has a mandatory arrest
protocol, calling for a police officer to make an arrest when probable
cause exists in domestic violence cases involving one of five circumstances: (1) when the abuser commits a felony; (2) when the officer
sees visible signs of injury, or when the abuser uses a weapon to
inflict injury, intimidate, or threaten a victim; (3) when the abuser
commits a misdemeanor and the officer is aware that the abuser has
committed other acts of domestic violence in the past; (4) when the
officer witnesses the offense; or (5) when the officer confirms that a
valid order of protection is in effect, and that the abuser has violated a
condition of the order.75 The DuPage County Protocol also requires a
police officer to: (1) offer the victims of abuse transportation to a
medical facility for treatment if necessary; (2) provide information and
assistance about petitioning for an emergency protective order; (3)
advise that, even if the officer does not arrest the abuser, the victim
still has a right to file a criminal complaint at a later date; (4) stress the
importance of preserving evidence, such as photographing visible
injuries; and (5) contact the victim advocacy service for assistance
during the officer's shift, or immediately if the victim needs on-site
advocacy services.76
Any law enforcement protocol is only as effective as the agency's
officer education, training, and compliance. Unfortunately, old habits
die hard. For example, in one case, the police told the advocate that
the abuser was only affected by the hot weather and that "when it cools
off, he will cool off. '7 7 The traditional "walk around the block" to "let
things cool down" should be a police response of the past. It is clear,
however, that both the police and the public will continue to grow
more sensitive to this issue and comply with law enforcement protocols as awareness of this issue increases.

74.

75.

ILLCOMP. STAT. ANN. ch 750, § 60/301.1.

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE MANUAL, supra note 47, at 1-8 to 1-9.
76. Id. at 1-5 to 1-6.
77. Deborah Nelson & Rebecca Caff, Cops Faulted in Domestic Cases, CHI. SUNTIMES, June 22, 1994, at 6.
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Perhaps the easiest way to encourage police officers' compliance
with law enforcement protocols is to publicize the potential for civil
liability if an officer fails to properly respond to a domestic dispute.
Notwithstanding this view, however, the Act specifically limits law
enforcement liability. Under the Act, law enforcement officers acting
in good faith to render emergency assistance or to otherwise enforce
the Act shall be immune from civil liability unless their misconduct is
willful or wanton. 78 Victims are now challenging this immunity in the
courts.7 9

Several courts have ruled that police have an affirmative duty to
protect against domestic violence.8° For example, in Thurman v. City
of Torrington,8' a federal district court denied a motion to dismiss a
complaint which alleged that a municipality and its police officers
failed to perform their official duties to protect a victim of domestic
violence.82 The Thurman court opined that the police may not treat
instances of domestic violence less seriously than other types of
assault simply because of the relationship between the two persons
involved,83 and that a municipality must enforce laws against domestic
violence just as it enforces those against any other kind of violence.84
78. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 750, § 60/305 (West 1993). The Act also immunizes
the officer's supervisor or employer. Id.
79. In June 1994, six women filed a federal class action suit charging the Chicago
Police Department with failing to enforce the Act. McDonald v. City of Chicago, No.
94 C 3623 (N.D. Ill. filed June 13, 1994); Finley v. City of Chicago, No. 94 C 3624
(N.D. Ill. filed June 13, 1994).
80. Cf. Cooper v. Molko, 512 F. Supp. 563, 567-68 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (holding that
the failure to take reasonable measures to protect the civil rights of those the police
have reason to believe may be threatened is a denial of equal protection of the laws and is
actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988)); Huey v. Barloga, 277 F. Supp. 864, 872-73
(N.D. I11.
1967) (same).
81. 595 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984).
82. Id. at 1527-29. The complaint was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Equal
Protection Clause of the Constitution. Id. at 1524. In Thurman, the plaintiff alleged
that her estranged husband had repeatedly harassed, threatened, and assaulted her,
violating his probation as well as a restraining order. Id. at 1524-26. During this time,
the plaintiff alleged that the police had continually refused to accept her complaints or
arrest her estranged husband. Id.
83. Id. at 1528.
84. See id. at 1527. Law enforcement has a particular duty to enforce civil protection
orders. In Baker v. City of New York, 269 N.Y.S.2d 515 (N.Y. App. Div. 1966), a New
York appellate court acknowledged that although "[a] municipality may not be held
liable for [the] failure to provide general police protection ... there may be liability if
there exists on the part of the municipality 'some relationship * * * creating a duty to
use due care for the benefit of particular persons or classes of persons."' Id. at 518
(citations omitted) (quoting Motyka v. City of Amsterdam, 204 N.E.2d 635, 637 (N.Y.
1965)). The Baker court went on to state that the plaintiff, holding an unenforced order
of protection, was one to whom the city owed such a special duty, noting that she "was.
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Therefore, although the Act grants partial immunity to Illinois law
enforcement officers, police officers may not disregard their responsibilities to enforce protective orders or make arrests when they believe
there is probable cause that a domestic battery has occurred.
VII. BOND RESTRICTIONS
Just as protective orders may protect domestic violence victims from
future harm, bond restrictions may also guarantee victims some form
of protection. Under Illinois law, when a person is charged with a
criminal offense and the victim is a family or household member, the
court shall impose conditions at the time of the defendant's release on
bond that will restrict the defendant's access to the victim. 85 Unless
the court provides otherwise, these restrictions shall include requirements that the defendant (1) refrain from contact with the victim for at
least seventy-two hours after being released; and (2) refrain from
entering or remaining at the victim's residence for at least seventy-two
hours after being released.86
This "stay away" provision is most helpful to victims. The provision gives the victim a window of opportunity to obtain an order of
protection so that the no-contact order and any exclusive possession
can be continued for a longer period of time. Furthermore, if such a
defendant should knowingly violate a condition of his release, he may
be charged with the criminal offense of violation of bail bond, a Class
singled out by [the] judicial process as a person in need of special protection." Id.
Later, in 1978, the New York City Police Department settled a suit brought by 12
battered women claiming that their pleas for help had been largely ignored. Bruno v.
Codd, 407 N.Y.S.2d 165 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978), aff'd, 393 N.E.2d 976 (N.Y. 1979).
Under the terms of the settlement, the police department signed a consent decree,
agreeing:
[T]o respond swiftly to every request for protection and, as in an ordinary
criminal case, to arrest the husband whenever there is reasonable cause to
believe that a felony has been committed against the wife or that an order of
protection or temporary order of protection has been violated. Moreover,
[under the terms of the decree,] officers [agree] to remain at the scene of the
alleged crime or violation in order to terminate or prevent the commission of
further offenses and to provide the wife with other assistance. To assure that
these undertakings are fulfilled, supervisory police officers [agree] to make all
necessary revisions in their disciplinary and other regulations.
Bruno, 393 N.E.2d at 980.
85. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 725, § 5/110-10 (West Supp. 1995).
86. Id. The 72 hour period is only a minimum; the judge who sets bond in a domestic
case may require that the defendant have absolutely no contact with the victim until the
case is resolved, effectively extending the stay away bond restriction provided under the
statute. In addition, the statute requires that local law enforcement agencies develop
standardized bond forms for use in cases involving family or household members. Id.
§ 5/110-10(e).

676

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 26

A misdemeanor.87
VIII.

DURATION OF PLENARY ORDERS OF PROTECTION IN
CRIMINAL CASES

When plenary orders of protection are issued in conjunction with a
pending criminal case, there is always an issue as to how long the
order should remain in effect without further review. The Domestic
Violence Act attempts to delineate these terms. 88 Nevertheless, the Act
fails to advise whether plenary orders of protection should track the
criminal charge until disposition or simply last for two years upon
issuance. When making this key decision, a judge should consider the
victim's inconvenience in returning to extend her order, especially
when the criminal case is continued, either for the failure of the
defendant to appear or upon the motion of either party. Notwithstanding this concern, however, a judge should also consider the
defendant's rights. If the State ultimately dismisses the criminal case,
or the court finds the defendant not guilty, a thoughtless two-year extension seems to abrogate the defendant's due process rights. This
issue is most bothersome when the remedy at issue is the exclusive
possession of a household, the temporary legal custody of a minor
child, or the possession of certain personal property.
To avoid this potential abrogation of a defendant's due process
rights, a judge should continue a plenary order of protection issued
during a defendant's pre-trial release period up to the trial date. If the
defendant is found guilty at trial, then the judge may extend the order
87. Id. ch. 720, § 5/32-10(b).
88. The Act provides:
A plenary order of protection entered in conjunction with a criminal
prosecution shall remain in effect as follows:
(i) if entered during pre-trial release, until disposition, withdrawal, or
dismissal of the underlying charge; if, however, the case is continued as an
independent cause of action, the order's duration may be for a fixed period of
time not to exceed 2 years;
(ii) if in effect in conjunction with a bond forfeiture warrant, until final
disposition or additional period of time not exceeding 2 years; no order of
protection, however, shall be terminated by a dismissal that is accompanied
by the issuance of a bond forfeiture warrant;
(iii) until expiration of any supervision, conditional discharge, probation,
periodic imprisonment, parole or mandatory supervised release and for an
additional period of time thereafter not exceeding 2 years; or
(iv) until the date set by the court for expiration of any sentence of
imprisonment and subsequent parole or mandatory supervised release and for
an additional period of time thereafter not exceeding 2 years.
Id. ch. 750, § 60/220(b)(2). The Act does not define what it means to have a criminal
case continued as an "independent cause of action."
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of protection for the period of the sentence. If the criminal charge is
dismissed, or if the defendant is found not guilty, however, it is then
incumbent upon the victim to establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that the court should extend the order as an "independent
cause of action.

'89

The judge may then make an evidentiary deter-

mination of the victim's claims.
IX. THE RELUCTANT VICTIM

One of the greatest problems in dealing with criminal charges of
domestic violence is the victim's reluctance to cooperate with the prosecution's effort to convict the defendant. Due to the unique nature of
the offense, and the defendant's access to the victim, the injured party
may not wish to come forth to testify for a variety of reasons. The
victim may feel intimidated or fear losing financial support, or the
victim may reconcile with the defendant and not wish to jeopardize the
current harmony between them. Finally, the victim may simply prefer
to rely upon "the devil she knows" than upon a complicated and
forbidding criminal justice system that she does not know. For whatever reason, the burden of pressing charges often seems too great for a
domestic violence victim to bear.
In an effort to ease the burden on the victim, many prosecuting
agencies have attempted to shift the burden of pressing charges to the
State. If a victim wishes to drop charges, the standard response by
both the prosecution and the court is that the State of Illinois is
prosecuting the case and intends to proceed to trial. The prosecuting
agencies will then consider dismissing the charges only when the
credibility of the victim is in doubt or when the victim will testify substantially differently from her prior statements or police reports. Even
so, however, the prosecutor generally needs supervisor approval for
such a dismissal.
Under most domestic violence protocols, the State usually subpoenas the victim to testify at trial.' If the victim fails to comply with
the subpoena, the prosecutor requests a rule to show cause why she
should not be held in contempt. 9' If the victim still fails to appear in
court, the State may request a writ of attachment.92 The court must
then decide whether the victim should be physically arrested and held
89. See id. § 60/220(b)(2)(i); supra note 88 and accompanying text.
90. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE MANUAL, supra note 47, at 2a-5. In the author's experience,
this is not only the policy in DuPage County, Illinois, but also in various other county
protocols.
91. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE MANUAL, supra note 47, at 2a-5.
92. Id.
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in jail on the contempt charge.93
If the victim-witness complies with the subpoena and comes to
court, she may decide to assert the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination.94 This privilege does not exist unless there are
reasonable grounds to fear self-incrimination. Once a witness asserts
her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, the court
must determine if there is a real danger of incrimination.96 If the State
grants the victim immunity, 97 however, the court can compel the victim
to testify, backed up with the threat of contempt of court charges.98
X. BATTERERS' TREATMENT PROGRAMS

Research suggests that the key to any effective sentence for
domestic violence is the requirement that the defendant complete a
batterers' treatment or counseling program. 99 The Domestic Violence
Advisory Council in Illinois has recently completed a draft proposal
for an Illinois protocol for domestic abuse batterers' programs.' 0
This protocol sets forth the necessary program goals, structure, content, standards, accountability, and fee structure, and deals with the
necessity for specially trained counselors and support staff.'0 '
In an effort to provide some basis for monitoring the counseling that
defendants receive from sources of their own choosing, DuPage
93. In her courtroom, the author has declined to go this far, believing that it further
victimizes individuals who may have legitimate fears of coming to court. Moreover, the
author believes that victim court advocates can provide invaluable assistance in
determining the reason why a witness is choosing to disobey a court subpoena.
94. Generally, the incrimination would relate to either a potential charge for filing a
false police report or to a complaint for domestic battery, with the defendant as a victim.
95. In re Zisook, 430 N.E.2d 1037, 1041 (II1. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1134
(1982). Neither an unreasonable fear of self-incrimination nor a mere reluctance to
testify is a ground for claiming the privilege. Id.
96. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951); People v. Redd, 553 N.E.2d
316, 339 (I11.1990). The witness is not required to prove that the answer to a particular
question would necessarily subject her to prosecution. Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486-87.
Otherwise, she would be compelled to surrender the very protection which the privilege
is designed to guarantee. Id.
97. See ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 725, §§ 5/106-1 to 5/106-2 (West 1993).
98. Id. § 5/106-3. When a witness is granted immunity, the witness is granted
transactional immunity, under which the witness is fully immunized from prosecution
for any offense to which the compelled testimony may relate. Id. § 5/106-2. If the State
grants immunity under such statutory authority, the granting of immunity must strictly
comply with the terms of the statute. People v. Goodwin, 499 N.E.2d 119, 121 (Iil.
App. 4th Dist. 1986), appeal denied, 505 N.E.2d 357 (I11.1987).
99. See FINN & COLSON, supra note 52, at 44.
100. ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC AID, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ADVISORY COUNCIL,
ILLINOIS PROTOCOL FOR DOMESTIC ABUSE BATrERERS PROGRAMS (1994).

101.

Id.
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County has developed recommended standards for the treatment of
perpetrators of domestic violence. 2 DuPage County has also developed a three-tier County Batterers' Program which begins with an
evaluation to determine the appropriateness of treatment and to decide
which treatment tract best suits the defendant's needs. The evaluation
costs $150. Following the evaluation, the defendant may take part in
one of three different programs described in turn below:
1. A remedial program, consisting of six sessions, totaling nine
hours. This program involves an anger management seminar
designed to educate and alert clients to the necessity for
managing their anger. The remedial program, including the
evaluation, costs $330.
2. The standard program, consisting of a twelve-week psychoeducational group, followed by five monthly monitoring
groups. The standard program, including the evaluation, costs
$650.
3. The intensive program, consisting of a twelve-week psychoeducational group, followed by an eighteen-week process
group. The intensive program, including the evaluation, costs
$1,130. 103
If a court sentences a defendant to complete a domestic violence
batterers' treatment program, and the court learns during the evaluation
that alcohol or substance abuse problems need to be addressed, the
court refers that defendant for substance abuse counseling before any
violence counseling takes place.'t ° Additionally, if an evaluator determines that the DuPage County program is inappropriate for the
particular defendant, the evaluator will refer the defendant to the
appropriate resource, either the Family Shelter Service or the Mental
Health Department.'0 5
XI. CONCLUSION
Since the women's movement began in the late 1960s, the issue of
domestic violence has significantly raised societal consciousness and

102. See BILL MORGAN, DUPAGE COUNTY DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PROGRAM MANAGER,
RECOMMENDED TREATMENT STANDARDS OF DUPAGE COUNTY FOR SERVICE PROVIDERS TO
PERPETRATORS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (1991).
103. DUPAGE COUNTY PSYCHOLOGICAL SERVICES, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PERPETRATOR
TREATMENT PROGRAM LEAFLET.

104. The author undertakes this practice because in her opinion courts cannot
successfully address violence issues until substance abuse issues are resolved.
105. Usually these individuals are people with psychiatric problems or dual
diagnoses issues.
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has recently received national-media attention. 06 As a result,
enforcement efforts can only improve. As the public becomes more
educated about this problem, enforcement through the criminal justice
system will become more effective. The statutory framework in
Illinois provides a sound basis for attacking the problem of domestic
abuse in this state. It is apparent that the attitudes of law enforcement
officers, prosecutors, judges, and treatment counselors are evolving
toward the belief that the court system must treat violence toward loved
ones occurring behind closed doors in the same manner that it treats
violence toward strangers occurring on the streets.

106. See generally sources cited supra note 2.

